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Coalition Formation and Agenda Setting  
in EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
 
 




The  eastern  enlargement  of  the  EU  has  greatly  increased  the  heterogeneity  in  the 
configuration  of  preferences  of  European  member  states.  This  scenario  was  expected  to 
significantly difficult the capacity of the legislative process to take decisions. However, the 
decision-making in the EU has shown a remarkable capacity of adaptation in the face of the 
entrance  of  new  members.  This  article  argues  that  this  adaptation  is  indeed  normal.  I 
introduce  a  mixed  model  of  coalitional  bargaining  and  agenda  setting  which  explains 
legislative decision making in the face of preference heterogeneity. The model shows how 
coalition formation incorporates the preference variations infused by new member states in 
surplus winning coalitions adopting moderate compromises and how the intervention of a 
supranational  EP  influences  the  final  decision  towards  more  advanced  legislation.  The 
application of the model to the area of environmental policy shows that under the conditions 
of preference heterogeneity of the enlargement context, the EU legislative process is likely to 
generate legislation at medium levels of policy change, appeasing the risk for deadlock but 




L’élargissement à l’Est de l’Union européenne a fortement augmenté l’hétérogénéité de la 
configuration  des  préférences  de  ses  Etats  membres.  Il  était  attendu  que  ce  scénario 
accroisse significativement la capacité du processus décisionnel à aboutir à des décisions. 
Cependant,  la  prise  de  décision  au  sein  de  l’UE  a  montré  une  capacité  d’adaptation  à 
l’arrivée de nouveaux membres remarquable. Cet article, qui se base sur un modèle mixte 
de négociation par coalition et de mise sur l’agenda permettant d’expliquer la formation des 
coalitions  en  situation  d’hétérogénéité  des  préférences,  défend  l’idée  selon  laquelle  cette 
adaptation  est  normale.  Le  modèle  montre  comment  la  formation  de  coalitions  prend  en 
compte la variation des préférences induite par les nouveaux membres dans des coalitions 
gagnantes  en  surplus  en  adoptant  des  compromis  modéré  et  comment  l’intervention  du 
Parlement européen en tant qu’acteur supranational oriente la décision en direction d’une 
législation plus avancée. L’application de ce modèle au cas de la politique environnementale 
montre qu’il est probable que, dans une situation d’hétérogénéité des préférences liée au 
contexte  de  l’élargissement,  le  processus  législatif  européen  produise  un  changement 
modéré, réduisant ainsi le risque d’impasse mais réduisant également dans le même temps 
la possibilité d’une législation plus intégrationniste.  
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In 2004, 10 new member states from Eastern Europe joined the extant 15 members. 
In 2007 the EU extended its membership with the incorporation of Rumania and Bulgaria, 
completing a total of 27 member states. The entrance of the new countries has a potentiality 
to disrupt the fragile equilibrium in the coalitional dynamics of the EU environmental policy. 
As  in  most  policy  areas  subject  to  European  regulation,  it  is  indeed  undeniable  that  the 
enlargement has had the effect of considerably increasing the heterogeneity of preferences 
of EU member states (Dobbins, 2008; Hertz and Leuffen, 2008). Analytical studies predict 
that this heterogeneity is to decrease the capacity to act of the EU, leading to situations with 
a large potential for legislative gridlock (Lane and Maeland, 2002; König and Bräuninger, 
2004;  Tsebelis  and  Yataganas,  2002).  Yet,  contrary  to  these  expectations,  actual  voting 
behaviour in the period immediate after the enlargement shows a continuation of past trends 
of legislative performance, without a significant reduction in the volume of legislation enacted 
by the EU. In the years 2002 and 2003, the average number of legislative acts passed by the 
Council of Ministers (henceforth “the Council”) was of 194 per year. In the immediate period 
following  the  enlargement  this  amount  decreased  considerably  (134  pieces  in  2005). 
However, from 2006 to 2008 the total adoption rate was back to normal, with an average of 
210 acts per year
2 (see for more detailed analyses Best and Settembrini, 2007; Dehousse et 
al.  2006;  Hagemann  and  De  Clerk-Schasee,  2007).  This  continuity  suggests  a  notable 
capacity  of  adaptation  in  the  decision-making  process  of  the  EU  in  the  face  of  the 
enlargement, raising an intriguing puzzle about the legislative behaviour in the EU.  
The  area  of  environmental  policy  is  especially  representative  of  the  puzzle  of 
legislative  politics  after  the  enlargement,  as  it  presents  a  clear  pattern  of  preference 
heterogeneity between old and new member states. The essential collective choice problem 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Natan Cisneros, Matteo Gianni, Emiliano Grossman, Simon Hug, Sophie Jacquot, Beate 
Kohler, Jan-Erik Lane, Harmut Lenz, Mikko Mattila, Gwendolyn Sasse, Nicolas Sauger, Pascal Sciarini, Beate 
Sissenich, Matthias Thiemann, Robert Thomson, Cornelia Woll and two anonymous reviewers for comments on 
previous drafts. 
2 European Union Legislative Output 1999-2010 [database], Centre d’études européennes (Sciences Po) and 
Centre  for  Socio-Political  Data  (Sciences  Po,  CNRS)  [producers],  Centre  for  Socio-political  Data  (CNRS) 
[distributor] 
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5 
in  environmental  issues  is  one  of  regulating  the  effect  of  mutual  negative  externalities 
provoked by different domestic levels of production and consumption activities. European-
based legislation attempts to eliminate high levels of air pollution, waste disposal and health 
as safety hazards. Yet, the proper standard of regulation is a matter of controversy. The 
poorest, least industrialised European countries would prefer low standards of environmental 
regulation in order to preserve low costs of production and remain competitive. In contrast, 
highly industrialised countries with a pronounced commitment to environmental policy prefer 
higher  standards  in  order  to  protect  their  own  industries  (Heritier,  1999;  Scharpf,  1996). 
Since 1994, environmental policy has empirically shown one of the few stable coalitional 
patterns in the legislative process of the EU-15, consisting of a cleavage between Northern 
and Southern member states
3. As Holzinger points out, it was nearly impossible to form a 
winning  coalition  in  the  Council  that  did  not  include  the  (opposed)  votes  of  the  pro-
environmentalists and “laggards” (Holzinger, 1997). With the enlargement to Eastern Europe, 
however,  doubts  about  whether  such  a  coalitional  equilibrium  would  be  maintained  have 
soon arisen. A first reason of concern has already been suggested. The share increase of 
the  number  of  actors  in  the  Council  extremely  complicates  the  decisiveness  of  the  EU, 
potentially reducing the probability of the group to take decisions under the actual Nice-rule 
of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) from 0.078 to 0.020 (Lane and Maeland, 2002)
4. A second 
reason for possible disruption is suggested by empirical research. Basic empirical indicators, 
such as the GDP or the domestic systems of interest intermediation, have reinforced fears 
that the 12 new member states might not align themselves with the old member states in 
advancing EU environmental legislation (see Sedelmeier, 2002; Skaerseth and Wettestad, 
2007). Yet, in contrast with this gloomy scenario, legislative output in environmental policy 
has even increased in the years after the enlargement (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
3 The north-south cleavage has been identified also in roll-call data analyses, which treat decisions in all policy 
domains  of  the  EU  (Mattila  and  Lane,  2001).  Yet  it  is  in  environmental  policy  where  it  appears  as  more 
recognizable 
4 Thorough the paper, I take the TEC, as amended in Nice, as the reference. I do not use the Lisbon Treaty as a 
reference because the provisions for the Qualified Majority decisions rules in the Council of Ministers do start to 
be applied in November 2014. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 





Figure 1 Environmental legislative output before and after the enlargement  
 
 
 At  a  substantive  level,  the  increase  of  legislative  output  seems  to  correspond  to 
inductive accounts suggesting that old and new member states have been able to conciliate 
their disparate demands in environmental issues. On the one hand, old member states made 
sure that the new entrants committed to adopt the entire environmental aquis communautaire 
without considerable exceptions or side payments (Sedelmeier, 2008). On the other hand, 
new members were successful in negotiating special treatment with regard to the financial 
burdens imposed to them in the face of new issues, such as the climate change package or 
the  financial  crisis  (Lenschow,  2010).  Finally,  the  reforms  of  European  Commission 
consisting of the application diversified policy instruments, and the conciliatory behaviour of 
the EP, have served as institutional brakes preventing a race to the bottom in environmental 
regulatory  competition  (Lenschow,  2010;  Holzinger  and  Sommerer,  2011).  Why  so  much 
flexibility?  How  do  the  dynamics  of  the  EU  legislative  process  lead  to  accommodate  the C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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diverging preferences of old and new member states?  What is the expected direction of 
policy change resulting from these accommodations?  
These are the questions that motivate this paper. I delineate a spatial mixed model of 
coalition formation and agenda setting in order to explain how legislative decisions are made 
under the co-decision procedure
5. Following the analytical properties of the model, my basic 
hypothesis for environmental policy after the enlargement is that the flexibility of the decision-
making process is indeed to be expected under conditions of preference heterogeneity and 
of  a  pro-environmental  position  of  the  EP.  More  concretely,  the  model  posits  that,  under 
these conditions, surplus winning coalitions are likely to form in the Council, deciding on a 
common position beyond the status quo, but at moderate levels of policy change. Once this 
position  is  formed,  the  intervention  of  a  supranational  Parliament,  that  is,  a  Parliament 
holding preferences for more pronounced change than any of the member governments, will 
tip the balance towards a final outcome towards relatively more advanced legislation.  
The  proposed  hypothesis  is  empirically  evaluated  for  the  area  of  environmental 
policy, where both conditions of heterogeneity and a supranational scenario hold. In order to 
carry out this evaluation, I use data on policy positions of member states and the EP on 23 
issues from seven key environmental directives negotiated from 2004 to 2008. The data are 
part  of  the  extended  European  Union  Decides  project  (EUD)  (Thomson  et  al.,  2006).
6  In 
using this information, the objective here is to offer a general pattern of the dimensions of 
conflict  in  the  legislative  policy  space  for  environmental  policy.  My  research  design  thus 
takes the average of all policy positions in the different issues and provides also an average 
outcome, so as to permit an evaluation of the forecasting power of the model. 
    The paper is organised as follows. First, I provide an outline of the spatial model, 
conceived as a representation of the co-decision procedure, and advance the equilibrium 
properties of this model under different preference scenarios, including the heterogeneous 
scenario. The second part of the paper develops the model in two phases. A first phase 
                                                 
5 For other “mixed models” see König and Proskch, 2006, and Widgrén and Pajala, 2006.  
6 Details on the DEU research project are presented below. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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presents  a  spatial  voting  game  which  explains  how  a  winning  coalition  in  the  Council  is 
formed  through  a  two-step  modification  of  policy  alignments  among  member  states.  This 
process involves an extension of a Banzhaf power index, which specifies the probabilities 
that policy coalitions will have of forming a winning coalition, and a bargaining process by 
which those coalitions bargain the policy stance the Council will adopt as a common position. 
The second phase is presented as a procedural game of agenda setting. It addresses the 
effect of the intervention of the EP on the legislative process, leading to a prediction of the 
final decisional outcome. The empirical data on environmental policy is introduced thorough 
the exposition of the model, so as to allow for a more illustrative reading of the reasoning of 
the  model.  The  paper  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  explanation  provided  for  the 
adaptation of the legislative process to the enlargement. 
  
2. The model: Decision-making process under the EU co-decision procedure 
Most  of  the  EU  environmental  legislation  is  applied  through  the  co-decision 
procedure,  under  Article  175  Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Community  (TEC)  (now 
ordinary legislative procedure under Article 294 TFEU)
7. I will, therefore, concentrate on this 
procedure to model the decision-making process. The co-decision procedure is specified in 
the Article 251 Treaty on the European Union, and it is used to the enactment of Council 
directives.  Passing  legislation  under  co-decision  requires  a  qualified  majority  vote  in  the 
Council of Ministers and an agreement of a majority of the EP. The track of the procedure is 
the following:  the Commission submits a proposal, which is read by the EP and the Council. 
The Council adopts a common position on the proposal by qualified majority voting. Once 
this position is adopted, the Commission cannot make further amendments, and the final 
decision depends on the interaction between the Council and the EP. The EP can reject 
definitively  the  common  position  or  accept  it.  As  a  third  option,  The  EP  can  propose 
amendments.  If  the  Council  does  not  accept  the  amendments  of  the  EP,  a  Conciliation 
                                                 
7 The changes introduced in the voting rules and the co-decision procedure in Lisbon would only slightly change 
the results of the present legislative analysis.    C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Committee, integrating representatives of both institutions, is convened. A proposal passes if 
it is a voted by qualified majority of the Council and an absolute majority of the EP.    
Posed to represent this procedure, the model portrays the decision-making process 
as a mixed game of complete information with two distinctive stages. First, a cooperative 
spatial voting game is applied to analyse the coalitional process by which the Council reach a 
common position. Secondly, a non-cooperative procedural game will account for the agenda-
setting influence of the EP in the conciliation committee, which leads to the final decision. 
Following  Tsebelis  and  Garrett  (2001),  I  do  not  model  the  Commission  agenda-setting 
powers under the co-decision procedure. This is because under the co-decision procedure 
the capacity of the Commission to strategically vary its proposal is limited to the first stages 
of the procedure. For this reason, the role of the European Commission is restricted in my 
model to initiating the process with a proposal. Under complete information, the Commission 
would anticipate that whatever the concrete position on this proposal it prefers, this position 
may  be  changed  by  the  Council  and  the  EP  in  the  following  stages  of  the  procedure. 
Accordingly, my understanding is that the Commission “preference” is represented by all the 
viable alternatives in its proposal, leaving then to the lawmakers the discretion to decide 
among them. Given these considerations, the two stages of the model are as follows:  
 
The  coalitional  stage.    Following  a  proposal  of  the  Commission,  member 
governments strive to enter a winning coalition which will constitute a qualified majority in the 
Council. The model thus assumes that any government wishes to pass a decision and to 
have their preferences represented in this decision. This standard assumption of cooperative 
models is also fairly innocuous in the present context. The Commission is only expected to 
present a proposal in the first place if a discussion will follow on it, even if the discussion 
might  lead  to  maintaining  the  status  quo  (see  König  and  Junge,  2009)
8.  Member 
governments  have  spatial  policy  preferences,  so  that  they  will  prefer  to  enter  a  winning 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, the status quo is considered here as the reference point. As a consequence, for all practical 
purposes, an agreement exactly on the status quo will be equivalent to a non-agreement.  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 05/2011 
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coalition closer to their ideal preference. Governments first consider the possibilities to form 
preliminarily policy coalitions with like-minded governments. These first alignments result in a 
structure of coalitions in which there will be a dominant policy coalition of a bigger size than 
the rest. This relation of dominance among coalitions sets the protocol of the bargaining 
process to form a unique winning coalition. Thus, in a second step, the dominant coalition 
chooses to bargain a compromise with another policy coalition just large enough so as to 
complete the votes needed to form the winning coalition. This compromise will constitute the 
common position of the Council, setting up the range of alternatives that a qualified majority 
of member governments prefer to the status quo:  the Council’s qualified majority winset, 
.   
It is important to note that the coalitional bargaining presented here is intended to 
represent  decision-making  as  a  process  of  “implicit  voting”.  This  means  that  member 
governments  or  its  representatives  estimate  an  effective  qualified  majority  coalition  in 
negotiations preceding the final agreement, so that the actual vote may not even take place, 
and  decisions  may  be  even  reached  at  the  bureaucratic  level  of  the  Council  (called  “A-
Points")
9.  This is an important descriptive premise of any coalition-formation model which 




The  agenda  setting  stage.  Under  the  co-decision  procedure,  the  support  of  the  EP  is 
determinant to tip the balance between rival alternatives in the Council and determine the 
final outcome. Following the modelling approach of Tsebelis and Garrett (2001), I focus only 
on the final stage of the procedure, involving a bargaining between the “pivotal member” of 
the Council and the EP in the Conciliation Committee. Under this approach, and assuming a 
                                                 
9 A-points (Agreed points) are decisions are taken at the level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). B-points (non-agreed points) constitute the issues of the agenda that are passed to the Ministers for 
voting. The vast majority of decisions in the EU are adopted as A-points. 
10  The  only  formal  precedents  I  can  think  of  introducing  a  perspective  of  implicit  voting  for  the  EU,  without 
explicitly referring to it, are Bueno de Mesquita’s Expected Utility model (1994) and the conflict models of coalition 
formation proposed by Boekhoorn, Van Deemen and Hosli (2006). The operationalisation of coalitional decision 
making of these models, however, differs substantially from the one proposed here. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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supranational scenario, the EP will be more likely to obtain an outcome near its preferred 
policy the larger the size of the  is.   
The  procedural  model  presented  here,  however,  has  a  key  and  consequential 
difference  from  Tsebelis’  and  Garrett’s  in  the  identification  of  the  Council’s  pivotal  actor. 
Tsebelis and Garrett regard this actor as the least forthcoming government of the  , 
closer to the status quo. In my model, in contrast, the pivotal actor is defined in terms of the 
preference set that gathers more voting support in the common position of the Council. As a 
consequence, it is likely to reflect the preferences of powerful states in the   instead of 
the preferences of the most recalcitrant government, unless this government is also the most 
powerful  one.  The  rationale  for  the  choice  of  the  pivotal  actor  as  the  Council’s  common 
position, instead of the less forthcoming government, is that member governments bargain 
the configuration of the common position of the Council’s winning coalition. The terms of this 
coalitional  bargaining  establish  that  powerful  governments  within  the  Council’s  winning 
coalition  will  be  more  difficult  to  substitute  if  they  choose  to  leave  the  coalition  than 
governments with less voting power. It is natural to assume that their weight in the winning 
coalition will prevail over those governments that would be easier to substitute in the winning 
coalition.  
Given  the  components  of  the  model  just  specified,  we  can  state  three  analytical 
propositions  on  legislative  outcomes,  according  to  three  exhaustive  logical  scenarios  of 
distribution  of  preferences  of  governments  in  the  policy  space,  assuming  always  a 
supranational scenario: 
 
Proposition  1  Under  a  homogeneous  distribution  of  preferences  of  member  governments 
near to the status quo, minimum or nearly minimum winning coalitions are likely to form. 
Under this scenario, the size of the  will be highly reduced, and the capacity of the EP to 
modify the common position in the Council will be nearly irrelevant.  In equilibrium, outcomes 
will reflect only very incremental policy change or not change at all.  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 




Proposition 2 Under a homogeneous distribution of preferences of member governments far 
from the status quo, minimum or nearly minimum winning coalitions are likely to form. Under 
this scenario, the size of the  will be large, and the capacity of the EP to change the 
common position of the Council will be intermediate. In equilibrium, however, outcomes will 
reflect pronounced policy change.    
 
Proposition 3 Under a heterogeneous distribution of preferences of member governments in 
the  policy  space,  surplus  winning  coalitions  are  likely  to  form.  Under  this  scenario,  the 
capacity  of  the  EP  to  modify  the  common  position  of  the  Council  will  be  maximal.  In 
equilibrium, outcomes will reflect moderate policy change.  
 
It  is  then  clear  that  the  forecasting  of  the  mixed  model  is  very  dependent  on  the 
preference distribution we are to empirically observe in any given case. As noted, the general 
pattern studies have found after the enlargement is that of a considerable heterogeneity of 
preferences. This will also be the case in regard to the preference data we have available for 
environmental  policy.  Therefore,  we  will  concentrate  on  the  third  proposition,  stating 
moderate  levels  of  policy  change  in  equilibrium.  The  exposition  of  the  model,  however, 
should allow the reader to deduce how the other possible outcomes come about under the 
other hypothetical distribution of preferences. 
 
2. 1. The coalitional stage of decision-making 
In the first stage of the decision-making process, member governments attempt to 
agree  on  a  common  position  from  a  set  of  alternatives  presented  by  a  Commission’s 
proposal. In order to reach a common position, member governments need to assess how 
their preferences can be included into a winning coalition.   
 C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Constitutional coalition formation: a priory voting power   
Coalition formation is first conceived constitutionally. The basic question here is which 
winning  coalitions  may  form  in  the  Council,  given  the  formal  resources  of  member 
governments  (the  votes)  and  the  institutional  constraints  (the  decision  rule).  Cooperative 
game theory explores a probabilistic solution to this question, simplifying the decision-making 
situation in the form of a voting game (Felshental and Machover, 1998; Lane and Maeland, 
2000). A voting game is defined by a) a set of more than two voting actors; b) two possible 
subsets or coalitions that may form from this set: a winning coalition, and its complement, a 
losing  coalition;  c)  two  possible  outcomes:  winning  or  losing.  The  winning  coalition  is 
assigned  the  total  value  of  the  game,  while  losing  coalitions  get  nothing.  Formally,  the 
expression of a voting game is: 
 
 G= (N, W), where, N is the number of actors and W stands for the winning coalition. 
 
In its normalised form, the solution of the game is defined by the Shapley value, whereby the 
value of the game is given by a characteristic function v: 2    {0, 1}, so that, given a set of 
players N, a subset S of N is a coalition. The possible gains are: 
 
           
   
A winning coalition large enough to get the value of the game is a Minimal Winning Coalition 
(MWC), that is, a coalition such that the defection of any member makes the coalition no 
longer winning. Otherwise, the winning coalition is a Surplus Winning Coalition. 
The constitutional regime of the EU is a weighted majority system. There are two 
rules that specify a winning coalition in this system: 
 C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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(1) the number of votes, (w), allocated to the member states. The weighted system employs 
quantitative voting, by which states have different voting weights. 
(2) the decision rule deciding the quota, (q) , of votes needed to pass a collective decision.  
 
The rule of interest here is qualified majority, a 3/4ths
 majority. With the quota and the votes, 
we can model a constitutional regime as follows:  (q; w) = [q; w1, w2, … , wn].  In order for a 
decision  to  pass,  the  aggregation  of  weighted  votes  has  to  be  equal  or  greater  than  the 
quota, w   q > 0. Such aggregation constitutes the winning coalition in the regime. The EU 
Council, under the Nice treaty, comprises 27 member states after the enlargement. Their 
votes  are  weighted  in  proportion  to  their  population  size,  ranging  from  the  29  votes  of 
Germany to the 3 votes of Malta. The quota to reach a decision is 73. 9 per cent of the votes. 
A winning coalition then has to encompass 255 votes out of the total 345 votes. The EU 
weighted system has the following form:  
 
[255; 29; 29; 29; 29; 27; 27; 14; 13; 12; 12; 12; 12; 12; 10; 10; 10; 7; 7;7; 7; 7; 4; 4; 4; 4; 4; 3]  
 
This system has the form of a proper game, that is, only one contemporary subset of 
players may form a winning coalition.  
In their objective to form a common position, governments are interested in assessing 
how individual actors can be decisive in the formation of winning coalitions. The measure of 
individual decisiveness of states is given by their voting power
11. Voting power gives us an 
expectation of the influence among member states in a voting session. It measures the a 
priori probability that the vote of an actor has in deciding the status of a coalition as winning 
or losing. I use here the Banzhaf measure of voting power, which is conceived in terms of 
                                                 
11 The share of votes is not equivalent to the influence over the outcome. It may be the case that no matter how a 
member state votes, it can never be decisive in the formation of a winning coalition This was, for instance, the 
case of Luxemburg in the first six-member’s European Communities (ECC). The constitution of the ECC gave 4 
votes to France, Germany and Italy; two votes to Belgium and the Netherlands, and one vote to Luxemburg. The 
quota was at 12 votes: [12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1]. We can see that the MWC were to include a coalition of the three big 
states, , or a coalition of two big states and two medium states,  . Luxemburg was simply no needed to 
pass a decision despite the fact that it had a right to vote. It had no voting power.  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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probable combinations of coalitions. The original formulation of the Banzhaf index measures 
the “absolute power” of actors. The absolute power of an actor takes two forms of swing that 
an actor can make: she can turn a winning coalition into a losing coalition by leaving it, or she 
can  turn  a  losing  coalition  into  winning  by  joining  it.  This  dual  power  indicates  the 
decisiveness of an actor in relation to the decision of the group, since her capacity consists 
of tipping the balance of the collective decision (Felshenthal and Machover, 1998: 40). In this 
sense, a member government maximises its voting power when it can prompt the group to 
act. By contrast, a single swing would give us an estimate of the actor’ “power to block” a 
decision, but it is not a form of influence by which she can push through a collective decision 
she  likes
12.  We  obtain  the  absolute  power  score  of  an  actor,  by  dividing  the  number  of 
coalitions in which the actor is critical by the total number of possible coalitions in which she 
participates. Formally, the expression for the Banzhaf’s absolute power for an actor i  is:  
 
    where,   is the number of swings 
 
For the explanation of coalition-formation, we will use the “normalised Banzhaf Power Index”, 
which is derivative of the “absolute power” measure: we rescale the measure, so that the 
sum of the voting power of all actors amounts to 1.00. Thus we obtain an index of relative 
power of the actor in the constitutional regime, her share of the total power of the regime. 
Formally, 
 
 , where N is the whole assembly of voters 
 
                                                 
12 The relation of the individual voting power and the group decisiveness is confirmed by the equality stating that 
the absolute power of a an actor corresponds to the product of hers doubled blocking power—i.e. the swing for 
leaving a coalition plus the swing for joining it—and the probability group decisiveness (for proof, see Felsenthal 
and Machover, 1998: 49; Lane and Maeland, 2000: 38-39) C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Consider the following abstract regime, representing a QMV system: [5; 3, 2, 1, 1]. There are 
8 possible coalitions. The first member has an absolute power of 5/8; the second member of 
3/8; and the last two members of, 1/8. Normalising, we have the following distribution of 
power: 5/10, 3/10, 1/10, 1/10.  The basic idea in this measure of power is that the first actor 
would be able push the group decision towards the direction she prefers with a probability 
much greater than the last two actors. Thus, an actor would be influential insofar as she is 
decisive in the collective decision
13.  
Table 1 shows the constitutional distribution of voting power in the EU-27. We can 
see that, for a coalition to be winning, it will have to include a great number of member 
states.  Such  a  high  threshold  makes  the  regime  very  inclusive,  requiring  extended 
cooperation. However, the coalitional logic of decision-making remains, since it is always 
possible to exclude some actors from a collective decision (Garcia Perez de Leon, 2009). 
Accordingly, coalitional behaviour will dictate the direction of the policy towards a given set of 
preferences and not to others.  
 
Table 1 Constitutional voting power in the EU-27 under the Nice Rule 
 
Country  Votes  Bz. Normal                             
Germany  29  0.078 
UK  29  0.078 
France  29  0.078 
Italy  29  0.078 
Spain  27  0.074 
Poland  27  0.074 
Romania  14  0.043 
Netherlands  13  0.040 
Greece  12  0.037 
Czech R.  12  0.037 
Belgium  12  0.037 
Hungary  12  0.037 
Portugal  12  0.037 
Sweden  10  0.031 
Austria  10  0.031 
                                                 
13 A   more  used  alternative  measure  of  power  is  the  Shapley-Shubik  index.  For  the  EU,  it  gives  us  similar 
measures for the EU that the (normalised) Banzhaf index. Yet, the logic of measurement is different, based on the 
number of possible permutations in a regime. As Felsenthal and Machover point out (1998: 171ff), it also implies 
a different motivation of actors towards coalition formation. The Shapley-Shubik Index does not establish the 
same link between group decisiveness and individual decisiveness. Since it measures power on the basis of 
possible permutations in a regime, the order in which actors vote matters. Each permutation has only a pivotal 
actor, who holds a specific of bargaining power by being the one that can seal the outcome of the group. As a 
consequence, the motivation of an actor in joining a coalition has a distributive meaning. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Bulgaria  10  0.031 
Slovakia  7  0.022 
Denmark  7  0.022 
Finland  7  0.022 
Ireland  7  0.022 
Lithuania  7  0.022 
Latvia  4  0.013 
Slovenia  4  0.013 
Estonia  4  0.013 
Cyprus  4  0.013 
Luxemburg  4  0.013 
Malta  3  0.009 
Total  345  1.000 
 
Decision Rule: 255 (73.9 % ) 
_________________________________ 
 
Probability of group decisiveness: 0.020
14 
_________________________________ 
Winning coalitions: 2718774 
Coalitions:               134217728 
__________________________________ 
 
Policy coalitions in environmental policy: Extended Voting Power  
The constitutional distribution of power assumes that all coalitions are equally likely to 
be formed. Constitutional analysis is most relevant when uncertainty about the policies is 
great.  Yet,  in  concrete  political  situations,  actors  may  have  some  information  about  how 
proximate  their  preferences  are.  The  relevant  question  then  is:  which  coalitions  among 
governments are more likely to be formed given the policy preferences of governments? 
In order to integrate policy preferences into the analysis of coalition formation, we 
extend the voting game in the form of a spatial voting game (see Owen, 1995). We consider 
the ideal positions of actors in one m-dimensional issue-space. The basic idea of the spatial 
voting game is that the positioning of actors in an issue space modifies the voting power that 
                                                 
14 The group decisiveness,  , is defined as the proportion of winning coalitions, in the total of possible coalitions 
(Coleman, 1971):  
 ,  where d denotes the number of winning coalitions.  
For a voting regime to enact decisions, the winning coalition has to include more than half of the votes. The 
maximum of decisiveness is given when just one actor with all votes can form the winning coalition, such a in a 
dictatorship or a hierarchical model. Minimal actors’ regimes, however, are uninteresting for the analysis of voting. 
In voting regimes, the maximal boundary of group decisiveness is given by simple majority, where half of the 
members of the group constitute a winning coalition,   =  . The minimal boundary obtains with a unanimous 
regime, with only one possible winning coalition, the coalition of all actors,   = 1/ . 
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actors hold constitutionally. An actor has more possibilities to form a winning coalition the 
closer her ideal position is to other (powerful) actors. By contrast, an actor will reduce her 
voting power the more distant she is from other actors. A spatial voting game is formally 
expressed thus: 
 
G= (N, W { })  where W is the winning coalition and   is the ideal point of player i.   
 
One would expect that member governments are likely to form  policy coalitions with that 
other governments whose stances in the issue are proximate to their own. Since actors with 
more voting weight will be able shift the coalitional position towards their own preference, 
one would also expect that less powerful actors are preferred as partners. In other words, the 
coalitional preferences of governments have the form of a Euclidian utility function: 
   
  where   stands, as before, for the ideal point of actor i,  for the 
position of a potential coalitional partner, and v denotes voting power.  
 
Our first take of the spatial voting game consists of modifying the axiomatisations of 
the Banzhaf Power Index by taking into account the geometry of ideal points in the policy 
space  (see  Bilal  and  Hosli,  1999;  Hosli,  1996;  Owen  and  Grofman,  1984;  Pajala  and 
Widgrén, 2004; Van Deemen and Hosli, 2002; Winkler, 1998). The modified power index 
reveals a “structure of coalitions” (Owen, 1977) identifying groups of states that are expected 
to vote in the same direction and which, as policy blocs, aggregate a certain amount of voting 
power. We thus treat policy blocs or policy coalitions as voting actors, and a power index is 
computed according to the probability of these blocs to form winning coalitions.  
The evaluations about proximity of preferences in policy coalitions are conceived in a 
structural way, that is, before any strategic action is undertaken. In other words, we assess 
coalition building here from estimates about the initial positioning of actors, but not from the C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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way in which actors are expected to shift their positions in order to realise a winning coalition 
which favours their preferences. I hence do not consider the policy position that each policy 
coalition would be expected to hold as a unitary actor, as other authors do (Grofman, 1982). 
This is because individual actors are to see changed their voting power with any coalitional 
transformation.  Their  capacity  to  influence  the  position  of  the  coalition  will  then  change 
accordingly.  From  a  strategic  point  of  view,  it  only  makes  sense  for  individual  actors  to 
consider the relative influence within its coalition at the stage of forming a winning coalition. If 
we were to consider this strategic component from the beginning, the spatial voting game will 
properly  turn  into  a  one-shot  game  (Mckelvey  et  al.  1978;  Schofield,  2008).  This  will 
disregard  the  mechanism  by  which  coherent  preliminary  coalitions  mediate  the  coalition 
formation  process.  As  will  be  specified  in  the  next  section,  my  model  preserves  this 
mechanism by considering strategic behaviour of policy coalitions only when a preliminary 
structure of coalitions has settled.     
What are the environmental policy coalitions after the enlargement? In order to devise 
the  structure  of  coalitions  of  the  spatial  voting  game  for  EU  environmental  policy  I  will 
construe  a  policy  space  consisting  of  the  average  of  member  governments’  and  the  EP’ 
declared preferences on 23 issues from seven directives negotiated from 2004 to 2009.  
Data on the actors’ positions is part of a larger dataset configured by Robert Thomson 
and his collaborators for EU legislative proposals introduced after 2004 (see Arregui and 
Thomson, 2009)
15. With this data, Thomson et al. expand the research program of Decision-
making in the European Union (DEU). The DEU program collects data on positions, salience 
and outcomes for 66 legislative proposals and 162 issues introduced by the Commission for 
decision between 1999 and 2000, through expert interviews. Thomson et al. have included 
new data on 53 controversial issues from 17 legislative proposals discussed in the Council 
after the 2004 Enlargement. In the DEU research design (see Thomson and Stokman, 2006), 
proposals included in the dataset deal with issues that presented controversy among the 
decision makers and which aroused public attention (as manifested by their mention in the 
                                                 
15 I thank Robert Thomson for kindly letting me access to these data.  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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daily  news  service  Agence  Europe),  so  that  very  technical  and  routine  proposals  were 
excluded from the sample. Experts were asked information about actors’ position and the 
salience they attach to issues after the proposals were issued by the Commission and before 
the adoption of the legislative act. Yet, the actual outcomes are also included in the data set. 
This information in presented in issue continua where the SQ is located at the position 0, and 
the position 100 corresponds to the most distant position in regard to the SQ. In this manner, 
estimation about the degree of policy change is possible. The more distant outcomes are 
from the SQ, the more the policy change generated from the legislative process is.  
In  using  this  information,  my  objective  here  is  to  obtain  a  general  pattern  of  the 
environmental  policy.  I  will  thus  construe  a  single  issue  continuum  based  on  the  mean 
positions of decision-makers in the 23 issues negotiated in the following directives: the Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), the Waste Framework Directive (2006/12/EC), the LIFE 
Plus Directive (EC/614/2007), the Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC), the Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions  Directive  (2008/101/EC)  and  the  Car  Emissions  Directive  (2009/443/EC). 
Although  the  sample  is  too  small  to  adventure  statistical  analysis,  these  directives  are 
commonly acknowledged as marking the recent evolution of EU environmental policy.  I thus 
believe that the sample satisfies the purpose of accounting for the  general distribution of 
preferences in this policy area.  
Figure  2  shows  the  average  positions  of  decision-makers  in  a  one-dimensional 
space
16. Taking the averages, we can see that no actor was in favour of the SQ in all issues, 
nor for complete policy change.  
                                                 
16 In order maintain coherence with the next procedural stage of the model, I do not include salience in the 
construction of the policy space.  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Eastern                                       Centric Coalition                                                   Northern  
Coalition                                                                                                                   Coalition  
       
          CZ 
          EE    
          LT  SK  
   R   LV  MT                      SL                  IT     D 
   H  PL   CY         BU        PT  ES    EL  LU   AT  IR    FI  FR  UK              NL BL   SE  DK  EP 
   __________________________________________________________________________  
SQ    10        15       20         25         30       35        40      45     50      55      60         65        70                         
                                                                                                                                 
                
Strongly rejects any further measures                    Strongly favours new regulatory measures  
 
Figure 2 Average positions of decision makers in environmental policy.  
 
Note: AT: Austria, BL: Belgium, BU: Bulgaria, CZ: Check Republic, CY: Cyprus, D: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: 
Estonia, EL: Greece, EP: European Parliament, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, , H: Hungary, IT: Italy, LT: 
Lithuania, LV: Latvia, LU: Luxemburg, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, R: Romania, PT: Portugal, SL: Slovenia, SK: 




The  positional  analysis  gives  us  a  heterogeneous  picture  of  the  environmental 
cleavage in a supranational scenario in which the EP adopts a mean position around the 
point 70, at the right extreme of the policy space. In spite of the great heterogeneity of the 
policy space, we can distinguish a clear structure of coalitions in three groups. These three 
policy coalitions would, in fact, be formed after three sequential rounds of alliances among 
actors. Individual actors would first form a policy coalition with the actor who is closest in 
weighed distance. Then, these policy coalitions will form an alliance with the closest policy 
coalition, and so on. After the third round, the distance among policy coalitions is too large to 
allow us to infer any meaningful similarity among actors’ policy positions, that is, a similarity 
strong enough so as to induce actors to vote in the same direction. 
As  shown  in  the  figure,  the  coalition  structure  comprises  an  eastern  coalition,  a 
centric coalition and a northern coalition. The most conservative position in environmental 
policy is preferred by the eastern coalition, integrating all the new member states, except for 
Slovenia and Bulgaria. A centric coalition adopts a moderate position. This coalition presents 
a  considerable  dispersion  in  comparison  to  the  two  other  groups.  It  comprises  the  old 
southern and central member states of the EU. It is also noticeable that UK, the traditional C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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“dirty  man”  of  Europe,  shows  now  the  most  pro-environmental  position  within  this  group, 
confirming reports about the policy developments of the UK in this area in the last decades 
(Lenschow,  2010).  Finally,  the  northern  coalition  remains,  as  expected,  favourable  to 
introduce most stringent environmental regulatory measures.  
  With this coalitional structure, we modify the voting weighed system, which now has 
the following form: [255: 209; 94; 42]. Re-weighing the Banzhaf voting power measures, we 
can see that the centric coalition and the eastern coalition have both 1/2 of the voting power 
of in the Council, while the members of the northern coalition have no voting power and are 
now dummy players (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Modified Voting Power: Coalitional structure 
 
Policy     Member  Member Bloc  Bloc 
coalitions  Members  positions  Votes  votes voting power 
Northern  Denmark  65  7  42  0.00 
Coalition  Sweden  62  10      
   Belgium  58  12      
   Netherlands  57  13      
Centric  UK  49  29  209  0.50 
Coalition  France  47  29      
   Finland  44  7      
   Ireland  41  7      
   Germany  39  29      
   Austria  37  10      
   Italy  34  29      
   Luxemburg  34  4      
   Greece   32  12      
   Spain  29  27      
   Slovenia  26  4      
   Portugal  25  12      
   Bulgaria  19  10      
Eastern  Slovakia  12  7  94  0.50 
Coalition  Malta  12  3      
   Cyprus  12  4      
   Czech R.  11  12      
   Estonia  11  4      
   Latvia  11  4      
   Lithuania  11  7      
   Poland  11  27      
   Romania  9  14      
   Hungry  8  12      
Total  27           345  345  1.00 
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Coalitional bargaining: the formation of the Winning Coalition 
In  our  voting  spatial  game,  member  governments  in  the  Council  need  to  select  a 
unique  position  over  all  others  possible  alternatives  that  will  be  supported  by  a  winning 
coalition consisting of a qualified majority of potential voters.  How this common position will 
be found? 
The selection of an outcome will involve a strategic process in which policy coalitions, 
which act now as unitary actors, compete in offering a compromise to other policy coalitions 
so as to form the winning coalition. In some cases, the coalitional structure may guarantee 
the  formation  of  a  winning  coalition.  However,  under  a  heterogeneous  distribution  of 
preferences, this eventuality will be rare.   
As shown in Table 2, neither the centric coalition nor the eastern coalition reaches the 
necessary quota of 255 votes. They are both “blocking coalitions”.  As a consequence, a 
bargaining  among  coalitions  is  needed  to  resolve  the  stalemate.  Without  further  legal  or 
behavioural  restrictions,  the  process  of  forming  a  winning  coalition  may  present  cyclical 
instability, as policy coalitions may have different viable partners and not settle for a unique 
compromise (see Mckelvey et al, 1978; Schofield, 2008). Although in the empirical case we 
are considering this eventuality cannot occur, this will certainly be the case if the coalitional 
structure were defined by many policy coalitions.  
Given these cyclical tendencies, a bargaining protocol is needed in order to advance 
a general solution to the spatial voting game. I will define this protocol on the basis of a 
dominance  relation  among  coalitions.  Policy  coalitions  will  have  an  internal  structure  that 
makes  them  more  or  less  dominant  in  the  strategic  process.  I  introduce  the  behavioural 
assumption that the policy bloc that needs fewer votes to form a winning coalition will be 
more stable than the others will in its internal structure and will lead the process of coalition 
formation. The naturality of the assumption of dominance by stability becomes clear if we 
recall that actors are to see their preferences represented in any degree only if they enter a 
winning coalition. Thus, all actors have an incentive to avoid cycling deadlocks and form a 
winning  coalition.  In  principle,  policy  coalitions  could  switch  partner  coalitions  infinitely. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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However, they recognise that opportunities to better their interests will end at some point. 
Given  the  configuration  of  preliminary  policy  blocs  of  the  structure  of  coalitions,  they  will 
acknowledge that the coalition with more votes (more stable) is closer to form a winning 
coalition than minority coalitions. Formally, the relation of dominance is defined thus: 
   
Let G= (N, W { }), and let S and T be coalitions in G, and i N. Let  W denote the 
closeness in votes to form W
17. Then, 
1. i strictly prefers S to T, notation  if  
i and  ,  
1.  i is indifferent between S and T, notation if 
i  and   
3. It follows that S dominates T iff 
 
 
This definition is closely related to other definitions stating a relation of dominance between 
winning coalitions (De Swaan, 1973; Broekhoorn, Van Deemen and Hosli, 2006). However, 
contrary to these other definitions, this definition states the relation of dominance in terms of 
the likelihood that different losing coalitions have of becoming winning. In the present model, 
therefore, the formation of a winning coalition comes only after the dominant, but still losing, 
coalition bargains with other policy coalitions.  
With  an  asymmetric  distribution  of  votes  among  coalitions  in  a  proper  game,  it  is 
probable, although not strictly necessary, that we will find at most one dominant coalition. In 
the present case, the centric coalition, needing only 46 votes, is in a strategically dominant 
position with respect to the other coalitions, and will lead the strategic process of forming a 
winning coalition.    
                                                 
17 The value of  W is greater the fewer votes are needed to form the winning coalition (W).  C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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Given  a  dominance  structure,  I  conceive  the  formation  of  a  winning  coalition  as 
derived  from  a  strategic  interaction  between  the  dominant  coalition  and  target  coalitions. 
“Targets” are defined as policy coalitions that may potentially provide sufficient votes to the 
dominant coalition so as to form a winning coalition. The main objective of the dominant 
coalition is to pass a policy, so it will attempt to obtain the necessary votes to complete a 
qualified  majority  of  255  votes.  The  coalition  will  seek  to  modify  as  less  as  possible  the 
preferences of its members. The more power the members of a target coalition have and the 
more distant from the dominant coalition the members of the target coalition are, the more 
the target coalition will modify the dominant coalition’s preference set. It should be noted that 
the  dominant  coalition  needs  to  target  coalitions  which  are  decisive  enough  to  make  the 
coalition win. Given the characteristic function of the spatial simple game, until the dominant 
coalition reaches the sufficient number of votes to form a winning coalition, the power of the 
target will not have a negative effect on utility of the members of the dominant coalition. 
However,  once  the  dominant  coalition  reaches  the  sufficient  number  of  votes  (or, 
equivalently, 1.00 of voting power) the definition of the actors’ utility function stated above 
holds:  any  additional  vote  would  entail  a  loss  of  utility  for  the  standing  members  of  the 
dominant coalition. Thus, the members of the dominant coalition will seek to form a minimal 
winning coalition that maximises their utility and will bargain with the targets who are closer 
and just decisive enough, that is, whose members do not hold more votes than necessary
18.  
The empirical case of environmental policy we are examining does not present any 
problem of interpretation. As we have seen, the northern coalition, with 42 votes, cannot, in 
any case, complete a winning coalition. In fact, the northern coalition has no voting power as 
a bloc, that is, it cannot turn a losing coalition into winning. The dominant coalition thus can 
only target the eastern coalition. With 94 votes, this coalition provides 48 more votes of the 
46  needed  to  complete  a  winning  coalition.  Therefore,  in  this  scenario  of  preference 
                                                 
18 From the point of view of the members of the target coalition, decisiveness will be motivationally precedent to 
policy-closeness at this point of the coalitional process. This is because, following the logic of the Banzhaf index 
presented above, a government maximises its power to change a policy if it can make the group pass a decision. 
Even if its preferences are weakly represented within a winning coalition, the government still will obtain more 
rewards if the group makes a decision that includes this government’s preferences than if it does not.    
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heterogeneity, the targeting process leads to a surplus winning coalition in the Council of 303 
votes, with a probability 1.00 to pass a decision (see Table 3). 
Once the dominant coalition selects a target, it offers a compromise to the target so 
as adopt a unique policy position. The content of this compromise will be consequent upon a 
process of bargaining among the members of the dominant coalition and those of the target 
coalition. In particular, the policy position of the winning coalition is defined by the vector 
consisting of the weighed average of the positions of its members, where the weights are 
their voting power. Formally:       
   
   
   where 
 
stands for the ideal point of actor i ,   for her power, and   
 
 
In order to compute this bargaining compromise, we need information on the positions of the 
member governments which are to integrate the winning coalition and on their voting power. 
The  positions  of  the  governments  are  simply  their  initial  positions.  Their  voting  power, 
however, needs to be proportional to the contribution they make to the winning coalition.  I 
calculate  the  member  governments’  voting  power  with  the  normal  swing  variation  of  the 
Banzhaf  index  (Pajala  and  Widgén,  2004),  by  weighing  a  member  share  of  votes  in  a 
coalition by the power of the coalition. For instance, the normal swing variation for France (29 
votes) is computed as 29/303*1.00 = 0.096 (see Table 3). In the winning coalition formed by 
the two policy blocs, all members are decisive, since the leaving of the coalition by any of the 
blocs  will  turn  the  coalition  into  losing.  Yet,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  regime  have  not 
changed, remaining a weighted voting system with a quota of 73.9 %. As a consequence, not 
all the member governments will equally affect the coalition if they leave. Intuitively, we may 
think that actors with more votes will be harder to substitute if they leave. Therefore, the 
effect that member governments have by leaving will be proportional to the votes to which C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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they contribute to the coalition. This is the effect captured by the normal swing variation: a 
member’s voting power in a decisive group simply equals its share of votes in the group. As 
a consequence, this member will see its preferences represented in proportion to this share 
of votes. 
Using the values of the members’ voting power of Table 3, the outcome prediction 
from  the  bargaining  between  the  dominant  coalition  and  the  eastern  coalition  is  a  policy 
position at 28.86 (or, rounding, at 29). This is the common position of the Council, and will 
also analytically identify “the pivotal member” in the  .  
 
Table 3 Modified Voting Power: Winning Coalition – Qualified Majority 
 
    Member   Member  Member   Bloc    Bloc 
country   positions  votes   voting power  voting power  Position 
UK  49  29  0.096  1.00  29 
France  47  29  0.096      
Finland  44  7  0.023      
Ireland  41  7  0.023      
Germany  39  29  0.096      
Austria  37  10  0.033      
Italy  34  29  0.096      
Luxemburg  34  4  0.013      
Greece  32  12  0.040      
Spain  29  27  0.089      
Slovenia  26  4  0.013      
Portugal  25  12  0.040      
Bulgaria  19  10  0.033      
Sloavakia  12  7  0.023      
Malta  12  3  0.010      
Cyprus  12  4  0.013      
Czech R.  11  12  0.040      
Estonia  11  4  0.013      
Latvia  11  4  0.013      
Lithuania  11  7  0.023      
Poland  11  27  0.089      
Romania  9  14  0.046      
Hungary  8  12  0.040      
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2.2. Second phase: the intervention of the European Parliament: Agenda-setting 
  The second phase of the legislative process considers the inter-institutional strategic 
dynamics  under  the  co-decision  procedure,  in  which  the  EP  acts  as  agenda  setter.  The 
relevant question now is; how can the EP influence the collective choice of a policy within the 
?  The EP has a tradition of being pro-environmentalist (Golub, 1996; Holzinger, 1997; 
Liefffernik and Andersen, 1997). Such an “integrationist” stand of the supranational institution 
configures the so-called “supranational scenario” (Tsebelis and Garret, 2001). To the extent 
that  the  EP  can  exert  influence,  the  outcome  would  shift  towards  a  relatively  more 
progressive direction.  
  To analyse the inter-institutional strategies, I will draw on procedural models of EU 
decision-making  which  understand  the  EP  influence  as  derived  from  its  “agenda-setting 
power” in the legislative process (see especially Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001 and Steunenberg 
and Selck, 2006). Basically, a model of agenda setting consists of a sequence of moves 
between two institutions in a legislative environment. The agenda setter has the power to 
make a proposal that the other institution will either veto or accept. The formal power of the 
agenda setter is constrained by the range of policies that can be vetoed by a decision-rule. 
Under a unanimity rule, agenda-setting power will be minimal, but it will increase under a 
majority rule. Under the co-decision procedure introduced by Amsterdam Treaty, the EP is a 
co-legislator. In the final stage of the process, the Conciliation Committee, composed by a 
both  Council  and  Parliament,  becomes  the  agenda  setter  for  all  intents  and  purposes 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001, p. 23). The EP has a role of agenda setter in conjunction with 
the Council. How does the EP’ shared agenda setting translate into legislative influence? Let 
us examine how the co-decision’s strategic process unfolds (Figure 4). 
  I  represent  the  co-decision  procedure  following  the  model  of  Tsebelis  and  Garrett 
(2001).  We  differ  in  the  identification  of  the  pivotal  member  of  the  Council.  Tsebelis  and 
Garrett locate the pivot as the actor within the qualified majority who is closer to the SQ. 
Here, the pivotal actor is identified as the outcome of the common position predicted by the C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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coalitional bargaining. In the conciliation committee, the final decision will be determined in a 
bargaining process between the pivotal member of the Council and an absolute majority of 
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Figure 3 The co-decision procedure 
 
 
Consider the preference configuration for environmental policy, now introducing the 
preferences of EP, in Figure 3. In the supranational scenario, the EP has its ideal point, EPo, 
located to the right of the SQ, and generally, to the right of all the member governments, at 
the point 67. From the left, the group of governments around the position 29 is the decisive 
group in the Council and determines the set of policies that a qualified majority of states 
prefers to the SQ, the 
19. Position 29 is the ideal point of the pivotal member in the 
Council, Ci. Since the northern countries prefer more integrationist policies than the decisive 
group, they do not constrain the set in the direction to the ideal point of the EP. The range of 
                                                 
19 According to the customary assumption of spatial models, we assume that the preference sets of decision 
makers are equivalent to the points in the interval between the SQ and the points of the decision makers’ point of 
indifference to the SQ, (see Steunenberg and Selck, 2006). The  is then represented as the preference set 
of the decisive actor in the Council, having its boundary to the left at 58. C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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feasible polices is then bound to the right by the point that makes the pivotal member of the 
Council indifferent between its preferred policy and the SQ, at 58. Beyond this point, the 
pivotal member of the Council will not accept a solution. The simplest way to advance a 
prediction of the outcome of the Conciliation Committee, CCo*, is to represent it as a “split-
the-difference” solution, i.e.   (cf. Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Laurelle, 1998). In the 
configuration above, this is the point 48, which will be the final legislative outcome
20.  
Thus,  the  model  predicts  that  the  EP  considerably  influences  the  final  decision 
adopted  as  the  environmental  EU  policy.  This  policy  will  favour  the  introduction  of  more 
regulatory measures than the common position adopted in the Council. Yet, note that the 
capacity of the EP to influence the outcome is strictly dependent on where the Council’s 
common position is located. In the analytical scheme represented here, there is first an inter-
coalitional process within the Council that drives a qualified majority towards a determined 
policy direction. As a result, the influence of the EP is constrained by the set presented in the 
form of the Council’s common position, or more exactly, by the indifference contours of this 
position. Whether this position is more conservative or, conversely, more progressive, it will 
always signify a determinant constraint to the strategic choice of the EP. Analytically, the 
significance  of  its  agenda  setting  will  decrease  with  the  increase  of  homogeneity  of  the 
preferences  of  member  states  in  the  Council.  It  will  increase  the  more  disperse  the 
preferences within the Council are (see Mattila and Lane, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002: 35 and 53). 
If a homogeneous configuration of preferences is near the SQ, so the compromise adopted 
by the member governments in the Council would be. In such a scenario, the indifferent point 
of the pivotal member of the Council will be also close to the SQ, and the EP’s capacity to 
advance  more  progressive  legislation  will  be  almost  irrelevant.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
homogenous Council is far from the SQ, the outcome resulting from the bargaining in the 
conciliation committee would be well inside the boundaries set by the  . In this scenario, 
                                                 
20 Note that the EP is constrained by the  . Therefore, if the point     does not fall within the 
, then the CCo* will be just at the limit of the  . C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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the EP may obtain an outcome closer to its preference than in any other scenario. However, 
this will be the result of the EP being already close to a “supranational” common position of 
the Council. The EP will be less “decisive” and more “lucky” (see Barry, 1980) than in the 
heterogeneous scenario. In the case considered here, there is considerable heterogeneity in 
the distribution of the member governments’ preferences in the  . The final outcome 
predicted by the model, at 48, is quite close to the limit of the  , and the influence of the 
EP is appreciable.  
How  well  does  the  model  of  coalition  formation  and  agenda  setting  perform?  The 
actual average outcome for the 23 environmental issues from the DEU database was at point 
33  in  the  policy  scale.  The  model  thus  offers  a  good  approximation  in  reference  to  the 
average  level  of  policy  change  in  environmental  policy.  The  predicted  outcome  and  the 
observed  outcome  both  indicate  a  moderate  level  of  policy  change  in  the  area.  At  a 
substantive  level,  this  level  of  policy  change  is  in  tone  with  the  mentioned  descriptive 
accounts of Council negotiations pointing to pragmatic adjustments to special interests of the 
new member states. On the other hand, we have seen that the average position of the EP 
indicates a preference for the adoption of environmental measures which is not radical. As 
the  prediction  of  the  model  indicates,  this  moderation  of  the  EP  contributes  to  the 
maintenance of medium levels of policy change
21 . This finding also corresponds to the more 
conciliatory role of the EP in the process pointed out by observers (see Lenschow, 2010). 
Basing our evaluation on a general appreciation of the empirical context, we can conclude 
that the dynamics of coalition formation and agenda setting in the legislative process offer a 
good explanation of the continuous rate of adoption of environmental laws in the EU and of 




                                                 
21 Had the average ideal point of the EP been located at an extreme pro-environmental position, at point 100, then 
predicted outcome by the model would indicate a sensibly larger level of policy change, at point 58.   C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 




  This study has investigated why the EU legislative process in environmental policy 
has successfully adapted to the troublesome increase of preference heterogeneity generated 
by the enlargement to Eastern Europe. This adaptation is not only patent in the continuing 
pace of adopted legislation but also in a series of directives that conciliate  the disparate 
demands of old and new member states.  
The main contention of this study is that this decisional flexibility is indeed normal and 
can be explained by the coalitional dynamics in the Council of Ministers and the agenda 
setting of a supranational Parliament under co-decision. The co-decision model presented 
here posits a mechanism in which policy coalitions in the Council strive to form a winning 
coalition, which is to submit a unique common position to the EP for further negotiation in the 
conciliation committee. Under the heterogeneous distribution of preferences characterising 
the enlargement context, policy coalitions in the Council are likely to be large and internally 
dispersed. Without any policy coalition being able to determinatively impose its preference, 
the bargaining to form a qualified majority will involve a large number of actors in a surplus 
winning coalition. Accordingly, the compromise adopted by the group as a common position 
will need to accommodate a large number of different preferences. Such an accommodation 
of  preferences  will  appease  the  tendency  of  some  governments  to  seek  minimal  policy 
change, leading to a first node towards legislative adjustment. Although the level of policy 
change set by the Council’s common position may still be quite reduced, further adjustment 
will  be  reinforced  by  the  formal  intervention  of  the  EP  in  the  conciliation  committee.  The 
analysis  here  predicts  that  the  negotiations  between  a  surplus  winning  coalition  and  a 
supranational EP in the conciliation committee are likely to drive the final legislative outcome 
towards medium levels of policy change.  
  The empirical case of environmental policy examined here confirms the expectations 
of the theory. The application of the model to information on the positions of decision makers 
in environmental policy suggests that legislative adaptation has been successful because old 
central and southern states, which maintain a centric position in the policy space and which C. Garcia Perez de Leon – EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement 
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hold  most  of  the  voting  power  in  the  Council,  have  been  able  to  offer  opportunities  for 
compromise to the more environmentally conservative Eastern countries. On the other hand, 
the EP appears now to be less radical in its environmental stances than in previous periods 
of the EU history, hence tempering possibilities for more significant change in environmental 
regulation.  Overall,  both  coalition  formation  and  agenda  setting  contribute  to  explain  the 
absence of paralysis in EU environmental policy after the enlargement. Yet, the analysis also 
shows  that,  as  long  as  preference  heterogeneity  prevails,  we  should  expect  relatively 
moderate levels of policy change in environmental policy.  
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